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NOTES
CLEAN-UP ORDERS AND THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE: AN EXCEPTION TO
THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 represents the most sig-
nificant modernization and expansion of federal bankruptcy law
since 1938.2 This systemic overhaul was motivated by both changes
in the laws governing debtor-creditor relationships and a signifi-
cant increase in the use of bankruptcy by business and individual
debtors.' Aimed at removing many of the deficiencies of prior law,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat: 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982)). Title I
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 contains the substantive law of bankruptcy. See 92
Stat. at 2549. Title II establishes the bankruptcy courts, their jurisdiction, and the authority
of the bankruptcy judges. See id. at 2657. Title III contains amendments to other titles of
the United States Code, see id. at 2673, and Title IV outlines the provisions of the previous
act that were repealed as well as the effective dates of the 1978 Act, see id. at 2682. See
generally W. PHILLIPS, LIQUIDATION UNDER CHAPTER 7 OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT §§ 1-1 to 1-8
(1981) (overview of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
2 See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 5787, 5788 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 989]. The 1978 Act updated a system of
federal bankruptcy law that had been designed in 1898, and that was last overhauled in
1938. Id.; see Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
Prior to 1938, bankruptcy acts were designed to address specific needs. See Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840; Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517, 517 (bankruptcy relief awarded to corporations for first
time) (repealed 1878); Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 440, 440-41 (involuntary or voluntary
bankruptcy proceedings against individuals) (repealed 1843); Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2
Stat. 19, 19 (providing for involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against merchants) (repealed
1803). The 1898 Act placed bankruptcy jurisdiction with the district courts of the United
States, the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the district courts of the territories,
and the United States courts in the District of Alaska and the Indian territories. See Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. at 545. The Chandler Act, however, created separate bank-
ruptcy courts with distinct territorial limits, and with original jurisdiction under the Act.
See Chandler Act of 1938, 52 Stat. at 842. See generally 2 COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDI-
TORS IN AMERICA 16-30 (1974); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. V, v & n.1 (15th ed. 1984).
1 See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 5788. Since the enactment of the Chandler Act
in 1938, a tremendous growth in consumer credit has occurred. Id. The Bankruptcy Act of
1898 was designed primarily for business debtors, and at the time of the 1938 revision, the
consumer credit industry was still in its infancy. Note, Creditor Acquiescence as a Defense
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the 1978 Act seeks to preserve the financial existence of the debtor
while affording equitable treatment to all creditors.4
Upon the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, section 362(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) imposes an automatic stay on the
commencement of most proceedings and the enforcement of cer-
tain judgments against a debtor.5 The provision is intended to stop
virtually all collection efforts by creditors, thereby allowing the
to an Exception to Discharge in Bankruptcy, 58 IND. L.J. 319, 319 & n.4 (1982). The adop-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code in the 1960's also caused changes in debtor-creditor
relations. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 5788. The increased use of consumer credit led to
a corresponding increase in the number of consumers who overextended themselves, and
bankruptcy often provided the only possible relief. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6076-77 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 595]. The tremendous increase in the number of bankruptcies placed a great strain on
the federal bankruptcy system. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 5788-89. It is estimated
that the number of bankruptcy petitions increased 2000% during the 30 years prior to the
passage of the 1978 Act. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra, at 6077.
' See Julis, Classifying Rights and Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code, 55 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 223, 223 (1981). Three purported goals of the Bankruptcy Code are: (1) to pro-
vide the debtor with a "fresh start" (not applicable to corporate debtors); (2) to maximize
the value of the debtor's property on a liquidation or going-concern basis; and (3) to provide
fair treatment to creditors, shareholders, and others with an interest in the debtor. Id.; see
also In re Sampson, 17 Bankr. 528, 530 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982) (Bankruptcy Code intended
to provide "fresh start" for debtor). The Code is designed to avoid liquidation of the
debtor's assets and maintain his ability to meet his obligations, Note, Tort Claims Against
the Business Debtor Filing for Reorganization and a Fresh Start, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 791,
791 (1983), thus providing for the "equitable settling of creditors' accounts by usurping from
the debtor his power to control the distribution of his assets," In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 53 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-801). The
"fresh start" concept is based upon the belief that such a policy is "preferable to creating a
class of at least temporary wards of the state." Mordy, Dunn, & Johnson, Constitutionality
of "Opt-Out" Statutes Providing for Exemptions to Bankrupts, 48 Mo. L. REv. 627, 627
(1983). It must be noted that the "fresh start" doctrine does not apply to corporate debtors
since the 1978 Act contains no provision for the discharge of debts of nonindividuals.
Quanta, 739 F.2d at 915 n.7; see 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1982) (debtor must be individual for
discharge to apply).
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(2) (1982). The pertinent provisions of § 362(a) provide:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition [in bankruptcy]
. . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation. . . of a judicial, administrative, or other
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against the property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title.
Id. The categories of § 362(a) are broad, and encompass almost any type of action that can
be brought against a debtor or his estate. See W. PHILLIPS, supra note 1, § 6-1, at 45; see
also R. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 501 (1984).
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debtor to effect repayment or reorganization.' The automatic stay
is, however, subject to a list of exceptions set forth in section
362(b) of the Code.7 Specifically, subsections 362(b)(4)-(5) exempt
from the automatic stay certain actions brought by governmental
entities pursuant to their police or regulatory power.8 Nevertheless,
these governmental proceedings are subject to the stay provision if
they are deemed actions to enforce a money judgment, since the
stay is designed to interrupt all actions asserting a pecuniary inter-
est in the debtor's estate.9 Indeed, courts have struggled in deter-
mining whether an action by a state or federal government to force
6 See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d Cir.
1984); S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 5840-41; R. AARON, supra note 5, at 5-2.
The stay has been described as a "breathing spell" for the debtor. See, e.g., In re Mari-
ner Indus., 734 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1984) (overriding purpose of stay is to give debtor
"breathing spell"); Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 276 (8th Cir. 1983) (funda-
mental purpose of stay to provide breathing spell), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1015 (1984); see
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 5840-41; Olick, Chapter 11-A Dubious Solution to Mas-
sive Toxic Tort Liability, 18 FORUM 361, 362 (1983).
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code allows for the reorganization of corporate debtors.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1982); Olick, supra, at 361-62. A chapter 11 reorganization is aimed
at preserving the existence of the corporation, while assuring that claims of its creditors will
be satisfied as best as possible. Julis, supra note 4, at 224. A reorganization proceeding is
appropriate when the "going-concern value of the debtor is sufficiently greater than the
liquidation value." Id.
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1)-(8) (1982).
8 Id. § 362(b)(4)-(5). The applicable subsections of § 362(b) provide that:
The filing of a petition [in bankruptcy] . . . does not operate as a stay-
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation
of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, other
than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power.
Id.; see, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 700 F.2d
1279, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1983) (order entered to enforce injunction); In re Mansfield Tire &
Rubber Co., 660 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th Cir. 1981) (administration of workers' compensation
claim by state); NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1981) (NLRB
allowed to order reinstatement of employee with backpay).
9 See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir.
1984); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1982). Determining whether a particular judgment
constitutes a "money judgment" is particularly significant, since the enforcement of a
money judgment will be subject to the automatic stay. The policy reason for this distinction
is set forth in the legislative history:
Since the assets of the debtor are in the possession and control of the bankruptcy
court, and since they constitute a fund out of which all creditors are entitled to
share, enforcement by a governmental unit of a money judgment would give it
preferential treatment to the detriment of all other creditors.
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 5838; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 6299.
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a corporate debtor to comply with a pre-petition order to clean up
hazardous wastes should be exempt from the automatic stay.10 The
recent consideration of this issue in Penn Terra Ltd. v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources"' and In re Kovacs12 (Kovacs I)
illustrates the problem.
In Penn Terra, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that an attempt by Pennsylvania to compel a corporation to
comply with a consent agreement to correct environmental dam-
ages was exempt from the automatic stay provision." The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, on the other hand, held in Kovacs I
that an action to enforce a pre-petition clean up order was a
money judgment, and thus was not entitled to exemption from the
stay.14 This conflict between the circuits reveals an underlying ten-
10 Compare Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of EnvtL Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 278-79
(3d Cir. 1984) (pre-petition order exempt from automatic stay) with In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d
454, 456 (6th Cir. 1982) (clean-up order a money judgment, thus subject to stay), vacated
and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 810 (1983); see also infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
11 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
12 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 810 (1983).
13 733 F.2d at 278-79. In Penn Terra, the corporate debtor operated coal surface mines
in violation of Pennsylvania environmental protection statutes. Id. at 269 & n.1. In Novem-
ber of 1981, Penn Terra entered into a consent order to correct the violations. Id. at 269 &
n.2. Penn Terra failed to comply with the order, and subsequently filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 269-70. In May of 1982, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Re-
sources (DER), attempting to enforce the consent order, obtained an injunction ordering
Penn Terra to correct the violations of the Pennsylvania statutes. Id. at 270 & n.3. Respond-
ing to Penn Terra's assertion that the injunction violated the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, both the bankruptcy court and the district court held that the DER sought enforce-
ment of a money judgment, and the injunction therefore was not exempt from § 362(a). Id.
at 270. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the DER's actions
were within the police or regulatory power of the state and were not attempts to enforce a
money judgment. Id. at 272-79. Consequently, the judgment against Penn Terra enforcing
the clean-up order was exempt from the automatic stay. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5)
(1982).
14 681 F.2d at 456. The Kovacs litigation has a confusing history. William Kovacs, an
officer of Chem-Dyne Corporation, was sued individually and as a corporate officer by the
state of Ohio for violations of state environmental protection laws. Id. at 454. In 1979, Ko-
vacs signed a stipulation enjoining him from causing further pollution and requiring him to
remove hazardous waste from the Chem-Dyne site. Id. When Kovacs failed to comply with
the stipulation, a receiver was appointed. Id. Five months later, Kovacs filed a petition in
bankruptcy. Id. at 455. The bankruptcy court held that the attempts by the state to force
Kovacs to comply with the stipulation were, in effect, attempts to collect money, and, there-
fore, were not exempt from the automatic stay. Id. at 455-56. The district court affirmed. Id.
This proceeding, referred to as Kovacs I, was then affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 456.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court vacated this judgment and remanded the case pending
disposition of the Kovacs H litigation-a second proceeding instituted by the state of Ohio.
See 103 S. Ct. 810 (1983).
Since the judgment against Kovacs had not been exempted from the automatic stay, see
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sion between the governmental interests in protecting the environ-
ment and ensuring public safety while preserving the assets of a
debtor in bankruptcy. 15
This Note will discuss the scope of the police and regulatory
power exemption to the automatic stay and will assert that a cor-
poration filing a bankruptcy petition should not receive the protec-
tion afforded by the stay with respect to a pre-petition order com-
pelling the cleanup of hazardous wastes. In addition, the policy
reasons for favoring environmental protection over the rights of a
debtor and his creditors under the Bankruptcy Code will be ex-
amined. Finally, a three-prong definition of "money judgment"
under section 362(b) (5) will be provided that will suggest that toxic
Kovacs I, 681 F.2d at 456, the State of Ohio, in a second action, argued that the judgment
should not even fall within the scope of the Bankruptcy Code, see Brief of Petitioner at 2,
In re Kovacs (Kovacs I/), 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S.
Ct. 705 (1985). The state argued that the judgment against Kovacs was not a claim or debt,
and, therefore, was not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 727. See 717 F.2d at 987. The bank-
ruptcy court and the district court concluded that Kovacs' obligation was dischargeable, id.
at 986-87, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, id. at 988.
The Supreme Court held not only that the judgment against Kovacs was a "claim" or
"debt" dischargeable pursuant to § 727, but also that the state was, in effect, seeking to
enforce a money judgment. 105 S. Ct. at 708-11. The Court based its conclusions on the
grounds that a receiver had been appointed and that Kovacs had been dispossessed of the
property. Id. at 710. Indeed, the appointment of the receiver "removed [Kovacs'] authority
over the site, and divested him of assets that might have been used by him to clean up the
property." Id. Under the circumstances, the state could only be seeking money, and the only
way for Kovacs to perform was to pay money. Id. at 710-11. Kovacs is clearly distinguisha-
ble from Penn Terra because of the presence of the receiver. See id. at 711 n..
15 Compare In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1984) (bank-
ruptcy act does not allow abandonment of waste oil facility in contravention of state envi-
ronmental protection laws), cert. granted sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 53 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-801) and Penn
Terra, 733 F.2d at 269 (environmental protection should not be thwarted by stay) with In re
Kovacs (Kovacs 11), 717 F.2d at 987 (debtor's obligation to clean up hazardous wastes dis-
chargeable) and In re Kovacs (Kovacs 1), 681 F.2d at 456 (clean-up order should be stayed);
see also Wise, High Court Hears Arguments on Thorny Bankruptcy Issue, N.Y.L.J., Oct 11,
1984, at 1, col. 3.
It has been argued that exempting clean-up orders from the stay would create a "super-
duper priority" for governmental entities. Wise, supra, at 4, col. 1. Those opposed to grant-
ing the stay, on the other hand, contend that such an outcome would create an "obvious
loophole" and allow companies to "pass on their obligations to the taxpayer." Id.; see
Schwenke & Lockett, Superlien "Solutions" to Hazardous Waste: Bankruptcy Conflicts, in
AMERICAN BAR AssociATIoN, STANDING COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, ENVTL. L., at 1,
1 (1983-1984). The costs of cleaning up hazardous wastes may fatally drain the resources of
a company; thus "a confrontation is developing between ... environmental requirements
and other governmental policies protecting the bankrupt and its creditors." Schwenke &
Lockett, supra, at 1; Schonholtz, Seeking Shelter From Environmental Liabilities in the
Bankruptcy Laws, 8 CHEM. & RADIATION WAsTE LITIGATION REP. 353, 353 (1984).
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clean-up enforcement proceedings generally should not be deemed
money judgments, and thus should not be stayed by the filing of a
bankruptcy petition.
"POLICE OR REGULATORY POWER" UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
Subsections 362(b)(4)-(5) exempt actions initiating or enforc-
ing the police or regulatory powers of a governmental unit16 from
the automatic stay.17 Such power has been defined broadly, encom-
passing a wide variety of conduct 18 designed to protect economic
interests 9 or safeguard public health and safety.20 This broad in-
1 See 11 U.S.C § 101(21) (1982). Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines a govern-
mental unit as the:
United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory; municipality; foreign
state; department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States, a State, a
Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other
foreign or domestic government.
Id.
I' Id. § 362(b)(4)-(5); supra note 8 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm'n v. Incomco, Inc., 649 F.2d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1981) (commission pro-
ceeding to obtain equitable relief from debtor is action pursuant to police or regulatory
power of governmental unit); NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir.
1981) (action enforcing employment regulations is exercise of police or regulatory power);
Marshall v. Tauscher, 7 Bankr. 918, 920 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981) (penalties imposed for
violation of child labor regulations constitute exercise of police or regulatory power).
"Police or regulatory power" has been interpreted as encompassing a wide variety of
governmental activities over the years. Compare Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (state authorization of dam across navigable creek upheld be-
cause would improve health of riparian inhabitants) with In re Quinta Contractors, Inc., 34
Bankr. 129, 130 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983) (government action against debtor intended to pro-
tect employees from sub-standard earnings). For a general discussion of police and regula-
tory actions falling within the scope of subsections 362(b)(4) and (5), see Johnson &
O'Leary, Automatic Stay Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 13 N.M.L. REv. 599,
609-10 (1983).
Is See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 n.17 (1983) (state regulates utilities pursuant to police and regu-
latory power); In re Alessi, 12 Bankr. 96, 98 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981) (police and regulatory
power permits state regulation of horse racing); Commonwealth v. Peggs Run Coal Co., 55
Pa. Commw. 312, 318, 423 A.2d 765, 767 (1980) (Department of Environmental Resources
regulation of coal production facility not subject to automatic stay).
Is See, e.g., In re Greenwald, 34 Bankr. 954, 957 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (action against
debtor for reimbursement of medicaid overpayments); In re Powell, 27 Bankr. 146, 147
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (NLRB award of back pay); In re Heckler Land Dev. Corp., 15
Bankr. 856, 858 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (action by township to collect debt).
20 See, e.g., In re Shippers Interstate Serv., 618 F.2d 9, 11-12 (7th Cir. 1980) (legislative
history indicates environmental protection is valid exercise of police or regulatory power); In
re Lawson Burich Assocs., 31 Bankr. 604, 612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (state health law en-
acted pursuant to regulatory power).
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terpretation, however, has created a conflict between the goals of
governmental police and regulatory powers and federal bankruptcy
laws.2' Indeed, including every exercise of police and regulatory
power within the exemption to the automatic stay would under-
mine the vitality of the bankruptcy laws.22
Ensuring an equitable application of the exemption to the au-
tomatic stay requires that the term "police or regulatory power" be
interpreted narrowly.23 A narrow interpretation would encompass
governmental activity designed to protect the environment and
maintain public health and safety, but would exclude activity in-
tended to protect pecuniary interests.24 Exempting certain actions
21 See Wise, supra note 15, at 1, col. 3. The Kovacs II litigation represents the second
time in 2 years that the Supreme Court has examined a conflict between the Bankruptcy
Code and other state and federal laws. Id.; Schonholtz, supra note 15, at 353; Schwenke &
Lockett, supra note 15, at 1.
The unilateral termination of a collective bargaining agreement by a bankruptcy trustee
has unveiled a source of tension between the Bankruptcy Code and the National Labor
Relations Act. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188, 1191 (1984); see also In re
Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F.2d 890, 894 (11th Cir. 1983) (despite union arguments,
bankruptcy trustee unilaterally empowered to reject collective bargaining agreements with
approval of court). For a general discussion of the clash between bankruptcy and labor law,
see Note, The Labor-Bankruptcy Conflict: Rejection of a Debtor's Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 80 MicH. L. REv. 134 (1981).
A clash between the language of the Social Security Act and the Bankruptcy Code led a
number of bankruptcy courts to hold that a debtor may elect to include social security bene-
fits in the property of his estate. See In re Buren, 6 Bankr. 744, 747-48 (M.D. Tenn. 1980),
rev'd, 725 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 105 S. Ct. 87 (1984). The Sixth Cir-
cuit, relying on an amendment to the Social Security Act, held that the Bankruptcy Code
was never intended to allow bankruptcy courts to order social security benefits to be paid
directly to the trustee. 725 F.2d at 1087.
22 See, e.g., Missouri v. United States Bankr. Ct., 647 F.2d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 1981) (to
be exempt, such power must relate to "health, welfare, morals, and safety," but not pecuni-
ary interests in debtor's property), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); In re Gencarelli, 14
Bankr. 751, 752-53 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981) (statute regulating business hours of holder of li-
quor license not type of regulatory activity intended to be exempt from automatic stay).
22 See 124 CoNG. REc. H11089, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6436,
6444-45. Section 362(b)(4) should be narrowly construed so that governmental units can
protect the public health and safety. Id. Remarks made during the congressional debates
concerning § 362(b)(4) indicate that:
[t]his section is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit
governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and
not to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in
property of the debtor or property of the estate.
Id. (statement of Rep. Edwards); see Missouri v. United States Bankr. Ct., 647 F.2d 768,
776 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); In re Sampson, 17 Bankr. 528, 530
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1982). Contra Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 267 (§ 362(b)(4) should be con-
strued broadly, and "no unnatural effort be made to limit its scope" (emphasis added)).
z' See Missouri v. United States Bankr. Ct., 647 F.2d 768, 776 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
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that seek to clean up toxic waste sites from the automatic stay pro-
vision would require the debtor to retain as much financial respon-
sibility as possible for clean-up operations. 5 Thus, environmental
protection would take precedence over the protections afforded the
debtor by the Bankruptcy Code.2 6 It is submitted that strong pol-
icy arguments exist for such an outcome.
denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); In re Alessi, 12 Bankr. 96, 98 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1981); see also
In re Greenwald, 34 Bankr. 954, 956-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (well established that if
action against debtor relates mainly to pecuniary interests, § 362(b)(4) does not apply).
Historically, the power to regulate matters relating to health and safety has been re-
served to the states. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 489 Pa. 109,
116, 413 A.2d 1037, 1041 (1980). The tenth amendment to the Constitution provides that
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
X. The regulatory or police power of a state may be subject to congressional limitation. 489
Pa. at 116, 413 A.2d at 1041. However, "historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by. . . [federal activity] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Pursuant to the General Welfare Clause of the federal Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 1, the federal government has begun to exercise its power in the area of environmental
protection. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1982)). Section 101(a) of the NEPA provides:
The Congress, recognizing ... the critical importance of restoring and maintain-
ing the environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, de-
clares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation
with State and local governments... to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony ....
Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 101(a), 83 Stat. at 852. This federal activity has not superseded or
preempted state environmental regulation. See, e.g., In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d
912, 913 (3d Cir. 1984) (state and federal laws govern storage of PCBs), cert. granted sub
noa. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 53 U.S.L.W. 3597
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-801); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 97 N.J. 526, 543, 481 A.2d 271, 280-
81 (1984) (in enacting Superfund, Congress anticipated cooperative arrangement between
federal and state governments); see also CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2) (1982) (President
must consult with states before removing pollutant). But see In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 705 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("comprehensive federal legislation has
... taken [toxic substances] out of the domain of state regulation").
25 Cf. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1984) (abandonment
provision of Code does not allow substitution of governmental activity for debtor's responsi-
bility to comply with environmental protection statutes), cert. granted sub nom. Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 53 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985)
(No. 84-801). It is submitted that applying § 362(b) to clean-up orders will require the
debtor to retain at least as much control over the property as is necessary to effect the
clean-up procedure. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982); supra note 8.
20 See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 269 (3d
Cir. 1984) (environmental interests require that automatic stay be vacated). Environmental
concerns should also supersede the trustee's power to abandon the property of the bankrupt
estate. See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927, 929 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub
nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 53 U.S.L.W. 3597
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-801).
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GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
OUTWEIGH INTERESTS ADVANCED BY BANKRUPTCY LAW
It is well settled that states have a compelling interest in pro-
tecting both the environment and the health of their citizens 7-an
interest that undoubtedly encompasses safeguarding the environ-
ment and the populace from the egregious effects of toxic wastes."8
Traditionally, state activity governing public health and safety has
been considered beyond the scope of federal limitations absent a
direct conflict between state and federal law.2 9 Nonetheless, the ex-
27 See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub
nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 53 U.S.L.W. 3597
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-801); Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 269. States have enacted laws
forbidding unregulated discharge of toxic substances into the environment to protect the
public. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d at 915. Some states have explicitly estab-
lished a public policy promoting a healthful environment. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. 11, § 1
("public policy of the state . . . to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the
benefit of this and future generations"); LA. CONsT. art. 9, § 1 (legislature shall enact laws to
implement policy of preserving, protecting, and replenishing natural resources of state);
TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 59 (conservation and development of natural resources are public
rights and duties); see also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0900, commentary at 582 (Mc-
Kinney 1984) (New York adopted hazardous waste management title pursuant to Federal
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (Supp. V 1981)).
Recent catastrophes involving hazardous waste sites have focused public and govern-
mental attention on the great dangers that result when the environment is exposed to toxic
wastes. See Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy,
9 HOFSTRA L. REy. 859, 860 & n.3 (1981).
28 See In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333, 1335 (D.P.R. 1979); supra note
20.
29 See Bradley v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 289 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1933). In Bradley, a state
commission denied the petitioner a certificate to operate a motor carrier on a heavily con-
gested highway. Id. at 93-94. In upholding the state action, the Court concluded that if the
purpose of the activity was to promote safety, and if its effects on interstate commerce were
incidental, the activity would have been upheld. Id. at 95. Restraints on interstate com-
merce that create economic barriers between states, however, have been found to be uncon-
stitutional. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (condemning
economic restraints on interstate commerce designed to create local economic advantages);
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-22 (1935) (invalidating statute regulating
milk prices).
In Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), a state regulation
prohibited displaying advertisements on motor vehicles, unless the advertisements were for
products of the vehicle's owner, id. at 107-08. The Court upheld the regulation, holding that
"[w]here traffic control and the use of highways are involved and where there is no conflict-
ing federal regulation, great leeway is allowed local authorities, even though the local regula-
tion materially interferes with interstate commerce." Id. at 111. These holdings are consis-
tent with the Court's policy of "rebuff[ing] attempts of states to advance their own
commercial interests. . . while generally supporting their right to impose even burdensome
regulations in the interest of local health and safety." H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
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tent to which the state interest in environmental protection will
triumph over the Bankruptcy Code and its policy of protecting
debtors and creditors remains unclear,30 and courts are required to
perform a delicate balancing of the respective equities involved."1
The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The Supreme Court recently held that state interests in conservation and wildlife pro-
tection are also legitimate state purposes. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337
(1979). Such interests are compelling enough to avoid Commerce Clause limitations. Id. The
power of a state to regulate the use of water during periods of shortage "for the purpose of
protecting the health of its citizens, and not simply the health of the economy, is at the core
of its police power." Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982). Thus,
state regulation of the uses of natural resources such as water will be sustained provided it
does not conflict with any national interest as to the particular use. See Comment,
Sporhase, the Commerce Clause, and State Power to Conserve Natural Resources-Is the
Local Well Running Dry?, 14 ST. MARY's L.J. 1033, 1033-35 (1983); see also Frank & Eck-
hard, Power of Congress Under the Property Clause to Give Extraterritorial Effect to Fed-
eral Lands Law: Will "Respecting Property" Go the Way of "Affecting Commerce"?, 15
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 663, 672 & n.66 (1983) (states may exercise police power so long as it
is consistent with federal law). It is suggested that the foregoing principles militate in favor
of giving priority to environmental protection concerns when applied to the conflict between
environmental protection and federal bankruptcy interests.
3O See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court determined that the
judgment against Kovacs constituted a "claim," see Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 708-10,
(1985), and, therefore, the argument that the Kovacs I decision is moot has been rejected,
see Brief of Petitioner at 2, In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 705
(1985). Thus, the Sixth Circuit still must consider the stay issue presented in Kovacs I, see
105 S. Ct. at 707 n.2, and the vacated decision seems to indicate a willingness to favor
bankruptcy interests over environmental protection interests. See 681 F.2d at 456.
31 Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945) (when state regulation
of local concerns also operates as regulation of interstate commerce, Court must balance
competing state and federal interests). In Southern Pacific, the issue presented was whether
a state statute regulating the length of trains traveling across state boundaries violated the
Commerce Clause. See id. at 763. Concluding that the national interest in an efficient, eco-
nomic railway system outweighed the state interest in safety, the Court invalidated the Ari-
zona statute. Id. at 783-84. The Court balanced the conflicting interests by examining
whether "the total effect of the law as a safety measure" sufficiently "outweigh[ed] the [con-
flicting] national interest." Id. at 775-76.
To survive Commerce Clause scrutiny, a state must show that significant interests will
be served by the challenged safety measure. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,
450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981); see also Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("if safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not sec-
ond-guess legislative judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens
on interstate commerce").
Even such a broad federal power base as the Commerce Clause, however, can be limited
by a valid state exercise of its police or regulatory powers. See Raymond, 434 U.S. at 443.
Since state environmental protection statutes fall within the ambit of the police or regula-
tory power of a state, Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274; supra notes 27-28 and accompanying
text, and since such statutes can survive challenge under the Commerce Clause, see supra
note 29, it is suggested that these state regulations should survive a clash with a less signifi-
cant federal powerbase; namely, federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy.
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states that actions aimed at preventing or halting violations of en-
vironmental protection laws were intended to fall within the ex-
emption to the automatic stay. 2 This statement of congressional
intent and the express requirement that section 362(b) be read
narrowly 3 illustrate that the legislature intended certain govern-
mental activities, particularly those aimed at preserving the envi-
ronment, to prevail over the protections afforded the debtor under
the Bankruptcy Code. 4 Therefore, it is suggested that allowing the
automatic stay provision to encompass a pre-petition judgment re-
quiring a corporation to comply with state environmental protec-
tion statutes is inconsistent with legislative intent.
State interests in environmental protection are complemented
by strong federal concerns over protecting the environment and
public health.3 5 Extensive federal guidelines regulating private use
11 See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 5838; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 6299.
"[W]here a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, envi-
ronmental protection, consumer protection, or similar police or regulatory laws, . . . the
action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay." S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2,
at 5838; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 6299; see also Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274
(state attempt to enforce order is obvious exercise of police power, and, therefore, exempt
from stay).
3 124 CONG. REc. H11089, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6436, 6444-
45; see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
" See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted
sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 53 U.S.L.W. 3579
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-801). There is no indication that Congress intended rights cre-
ated by the Bankruptcy Code to be unrestricted by health and safety regulations. See id.
However, there is evidence indicating that "Congress did not intend the bankruptcy scheme
generally to abrogate the enforcement of state police power regulations . . . ." Id. at 918
(emphasis added); see also In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927, 929 (3d Cir. 1984)
(equities must favor interest of public in controlling hazardous wastes over trustee's interest
in preserving debtor's estate), cert. granted sub nom., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 53 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-801).
In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979), decided prior to the
effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, illustrates the foregoing principles
under the prior bankruptcy law. See id. at 1339. Relying on the 1978 Act as persuasive
authority, the Canarico court ruled that congressional intent indicates that environmental
quality should not be superseded by economic considerations. 466 F. Supp. at 1336-39. In-
deed, Congress has stated expressly that actions pursuant to the police or regulatory power
should not be restrained by the protections afforded a debtor under the Code, and that this
applies to both state and federal governmental units. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 5838;
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 6299; see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
11 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 852
(1970). The purpose of the Act is to declare a national policy encouraging "productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment" and to "stimulate the health and
welfare of man." Id.; see also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic
Energy Comm., 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (NEPA "makes environmental protec-
tion a part of the mandate of every federal agency and department"). The conflict encoun-
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of the environment and various statutes seeking to conserve natu-
ral resources have been enacted in the past two decades.3 6 Congres-
sional authority to legislate in the area of environmental protection
arises under both the Commerce Clause 7 and the General Welfare
Clause38 of the Constitution. 9 Just as state actions to ensure pub-
lic health and safety have been upheld despite competing federal
interests,40 so too federal health and safety measures generally
tered in the Penn Terra and Kovacs I disputes applies to both state and federal actions to
enforce obligations to clean up waste sites. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 2, In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 705
(1985); see also linois v. Electrical Util., 41 Bankr. 874, 875 (N.D. Il. 1984) (court must
decide whether stay precludes continuation of action for violation of federal act); United
States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 19 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1177, 1178 (D.N.H. 1982)
(government contended that relief sought for violation of federal statutes should be exempt
from stay).
"6 See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982))
(response to hazardous wastes released into environment); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1281 (1982))
(to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters") (amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948)); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795,
2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (Supp. V. 1981)) (to regulate management of haz-
ardous waste); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003, 2003 (1976)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982)) (to regulate commerce and protect human health
and environment by restricting certain chemical substances); see also United States v. Price,
688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv. of New England,
496 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (D. Conn. 1980). Construing § 7003 of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Price court concluded that the United States may seek in-
junctive relief whenever it "receives evidence that the handling, storage, treatment, trans-
portation or disposal of hazardous wastes may present an 'imminent and substantial endan-
germent to health or the environment.'" 688 F.2d at 208. The court concluded that
Congress, by enacting such a provision, intended to "invoke nothing less than the full equity
powers of the federal courts in the effort to protect public health [and] the environment...
from the pernicious effects of toxic wastes." Id. at 214.
' U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-
83 (1980) (Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate activities causing environmen-
tal hazards); City of Gallatin v. Cherokee County, 563 F. Supp. 940, 943 (E.D. Tex. 1983)
(congressional authority exists for RCRA under Commerce Clause because hazardous waste
likely to be transported among different states) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6238, 6247).
Courts have implicitly recognized that congressional authorization for the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA) stems from the General Welfare Clause. See, e.g., Noe v.
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 438 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1126 (1981); Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp. 1363, 1387-88 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
40 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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have triumphed over competing areas of federal law.41 This fact, it
is suggested, lends support to the proposition that the federal in-
terest in protecting the national environment should supersede the
interests protected by the Code. Two recent cases addressing the
conflicts between bankruptcy and environmental protection stat-
utes support this proposition.42
In re Quanta Resources Corp.43 involved a conflict over a stor-
age site containing fuel tanks contaminated with polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs).44 The trustee of Quanta, who was already in vio-
lation of an order requiring clean up of the facility,45 sought to
abandon the property under section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code.46
Despite objections by the State of New York, the district court af-
firmed the bankruptcy court's grant of an order permitting the
abandonment.47 New York subsequently appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.48 The Third Circuit reversed, hold-
ing that the bankruptcy act does not permit abandonment of the
property of a bankrupt estate in violation of state environmental
law.49 The court determined that "Congress did not intend the
bankruptcy scheme generally to abrogate the enforcement of state
police power regulations." 50 Balancing the purposes of bankruptcy
41 See, e.g., In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333, 1339-40 (D.P.R. 1979)
(interest in enforcing Federal Clean Air Act outweighs bankruptcy court's order authorizing
debtor's operation of its business); cf. SEC v. First Fin. Group of Texas, 645 F.2d 429, 438
(5th Cir. 1981) (civil action brought by SEC against debtor not stayed by bankruptcy code).
42 See In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub
nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 53 U.S.L.W. 3597
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (Nb. 84-801); Illinois v. Electrical Util., 41 Bankr. 874 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
43 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 53 U.S.L.W. 3597 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1985) (No. 84-801).
44 739 F.2d at 913. The Quanta waste site contained approximately 500,000 gallons of
waste chemicals, and at least 70,000 gallons of these chemicals were contaminated with
PCBs. Id. PCBs are hazardous, toxic chemicals, and both their storage and use is subject to
an array of regulations. Id. & n.1.
45 See id. at n.2.
46 See id. Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate.
11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1984).
" See 739 F.2d at 914. Alleging that abandonment would create a substantial danger to
public health and safety, New York requested that permission to abandon be denied until
the toxic wastes were properly removed from the site. Id. New York also requested a lien on
the property with respect to any monies that the state might expend to clean up the site. Id.
48 See id.
49 See id. at 921-22.
50 See id. at 918. The Quanta court noted that Congress expressly provided for excep-
tions to the automatic stay. Id.; see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. Examining 28
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law and environmental protection laws, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that the interests served by environmental protection laws
are superior. 51
The court reasoned that "[i]f trustees in bankruptcy are to be
permitted to dispose of hazardous wastes under the cloak of the
abandonment power, compliance with environmental protection
laws will be transformed into governmental cleanup by default. '5 2
It is submitted that permitting a bankrupt corporation to stay the
enforcement of injunctive relief requiring it to remove toxic waste
would result in harm similar to that feared by the Third Circuit in
Quanta;53 in both situations the toxic material would continue to
pollute and damage the environment.54
Illinois v. Electrical Utilities55 is factually similar to Penn
Terra.6 In Electrical Utilities, the state of Illinois charged the de-
U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982), which provides that trustees should manage and operate the prop-
erty pursuant to the laws of the state in which the property is located, id., the court deter-
mined that the general congressional scheme of the Bankruptcy Code was not intended to
subordinate state and local regulatory laws, 739 F.2d at 919. Finally, the court noted that
bankruptcy courts are courts of equity with authority to apply equitable principles to the
extent that such principles are consistent with bankruptcy law. Id. at 920-21; see Stuhley v.
Hyatt, 667 F.2d 807, 809 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Huntington Ltd., 654 F.2d 578, 589-90 (9th
Cir. 1981); In re Ponteri, 31 Bankr. 859, 863 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1983).
" See 739 F.2d at 921.
82 See id. at 921. The court in Quanta found no basis for the proposition that the Bank-
ruptcy Code was intended to permit debtors to substitute governmental clean-up programs
for citizen compliance with environmental protection statutes. Id. at 921-22.
See id. at 921-22.
See supra note 27 & infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. A diagnostic study of
the health threat posed by hazardous substances is "intended to be the first step in the
remedial process of abating an existing but growing toxic hazard which, if left unchecked,
[would] result in even graver future injury." United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d
Cir. 1982). Merely requiring the termination of pollution-generating activity will not prevent
the dissemination of hazardous substances throughout the environment. Therefore, "effec-
tive public protection ... requires clean-up or containment of the pollution." Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14 n.13, In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d
984 (6th Cir. 1983), afl'd, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985).
85 41 Bankr. 874 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
56 Compare Electrical Utilities, 41 Bankr. at 875 (defendant filed for bankruptcy after
being charged with dumping PCBs) with Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 269-70 (Penn Terra filed
for bankruptcy after state environmental protection agency found Penn Terra's mining op-
eration to be violation). In both Electrical Utilities and Penn Terra, the corporation was
charged with violating environmental protection statutes. See 41 Bankr. at 875; Penn Terra,
733 F.2d at 269. However, in Penn Terra, a consent order and agreement was signed by the
corporation, 733 F.2d at 269, whereas no such order was obtained in Electrical Utilities, 41
Bankr. at 875. Moreover, the two cases are procedurally distinguishable; in Penn Terra,
injunctive relief was sought after the bankruptcy petition was filed, 733 F.2d at 270, while in
Electrical Utilities, injunctive relief was sought before filing of the petition, 41 Bankr. at
875. Nevertheless, this procedural distinction is of no effect, since § 362(b)(4)-(5) of the
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fendant corporation with dumping PCBs in violation of the Toxic
Substances Control Act.57 The state sought to enjoin Electrical
Utilities from further PCB disposal and to require the company to
remove the PCBs previously dumped.58 After initiation of the suit,
but before judgment was rendered, the corporation filed a petition
in bankruptcy.59 The court requested that the parties brief the is-
sue of whether the proceeding should be stayed pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 362(a),60 and subsequently concluded that the action
would not be subject to the automatic stay.6 1 Examining the legis-
lative history of the Bankruptcy Code, the court noted that section
362(b)(4) "insulates states from the automatic stay provision[s]
when they attempt to protect their citizens from environmental
hazards. '6 2 The court determined that an exception to the auto-
matic stay provision in such a situation permits the state to clean
up existing toxic waste while preventing further pollution.0
"MONEY JUDGMENT" UNDER SECTION 362(b)(5)
Section 362(b)(5), which extends the relief provided in section
362(b)(4) to enforcement proceedings, 4 specifically excludes the
enforcement of a money judgment from its scope,65 thus creating
an "exception to the exception."6 Consequently, debtors seeking
to avoid liability for violations of environmental protection laws
Bankruptcy Code covers both situations. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1982).
41 Bankr. at 875; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
"41 Bankr. at 875. In addition to asking for the proper disposal of the PCBs, the state
of Illinois also requested that Electrical Utilities pay the costs of the action and any costs




61 See id. at 875, 877.
62 See id. at 875-76; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 5838; H.R. REP. No. 595, supra
note 3, at 6299.
63 41 Bankr. at 876.
"See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982); supra note 8. Subsection (5) of § 362(b) extends the
exemptions of subsection (4) to include the enforcement of judgments obtained pursuant to
the police or regulatory power of a state. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982) (denying
automatic stay when governmental unit commences or continues action) with 11 U.S.C. §
362(b)(5) (1982) (denying automatic stays for government enforcement proceedings other
than proceeding to enforce money judgment).
65 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982).
66 See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 273. The Penn Terra court favored a narrow reading of




have asserted that an action by a governmental unit seeking to en-
force a clean-up order should be classified as an attempt to enforce
a money judgment.6 7 Determining whether any action or proceed-
ing is aimed at enforcing a "money judgment" must begin with an
examination of the form of the judgment sought. "
Noting the absence of a definition of "money judgment" in the
Bankruptcy Code, the Third Circuit, in Penn Terra, followed the
axiom of statutory construction that words, unless otherwise de-
fined, should be given their ordinary and traditional meaning. 9
The critical element of a money judgment generally has been the
designation of a definite and certain sum. 70 Determining that the
judgment against Penn Terra did not direct the payment of money
to the state, the court concluded that on its face the original judg-
ment ordering the clean up was not a money judgment.71 Penn
Terra, however, argued that although the judgment did not direct
17 See, e.g., Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 275 (debtor asserted that suit by government was
in substance an action to enforce money judgment); In re Kovacs (Kovacs 1), 681 F.2d 454,
456 (6th Cir. 1982) (order of government cannot be distinguished from money judgment),
vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 810 (1983); Illinois v. Electrical Utils., 41 Bankr. 874, 877
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (debtor argued that suit was nothing more than attempt to get money judg-
ment); United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1177, 1178
(D.N.H. 1982) (Manville argued that government sought expenditure of funds, not injunc-
tion). Clean-up orders must be closely scrutinized to prevent artful pleading by the govern-
ment that defeats the legislative intent to stay all actions that are, in fact or substance,
money judgments. See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 275; Kovacs I, 681 F.2d at 456; Electrical
Utilities, 41 Bankr. at 877 n.2; Johns-Manville, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1179.
"I See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 274-75.
"1 See id. ; see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1979) (fundamental
canon of statutory construction is to give words ordinary, contemporary meaning, unless
otherwise defined); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975) (words to be given ordinary
meaning in absence of persuasive reasons to contrary). The Penn Terra court looked to legal
custom and practice to determine the traditional understanding of the recovery of money
damages. 733 F.2d at 275.
70 733 F.2d at 275. Federal courts generally have defined a money judgment as an order
to pay a sum certain, and have excluded orders to perform a specified act. See, e.g., Kohn v.
American Metal Climax, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 1331, 1367 (E.D. Pa. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
874 (1972); Harris v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 228, 229 (D. Mass.), affl'd, 308 F.2d 573
(1st Cir. 1962); Terry v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 165, 166 (Ct. Cl. 1951) (per curiam); see
also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 907 (5th ed. 1979) (money judgment an order "to pay a sum
of money in contrast to a decree or judgment of equity in which the court orders some other
type of relief"). A second, less relevant, aspect of a money judgment, as recognized by the
court in Penn Terra, is that the parties involved be identifiable. 733 F.2d at 275.
71 See 733 F.2d at 275. The Third Circuit concluded that the action against Penn Terra
"could not have resulted even in the mere entry of a money judgment." Id. The court rea-
soned that the proceeding against Penn Terra could not have led to "the adjudicatio of
liability for a sum certain" and thus the essential element of a money judgment was missing.
See id.
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the payment of money, such would be the practical effect of its
enforcement and, thus, the judgment was in substance a money
judgment. 2 It is submitted, however, that a proper interpretation
of the term "money judgment" requires that three factors be ana-
lyzed: the nature of the injury, the purpose of the relief sought,
and the method of effecting that relief.
At times it is difficult to distinguish between the nature of the
injury and the purpose of the relief.L73 Attempting to determine
whether a pre-petition judgment ordering the debtor to clean up
the waste site was in substance a money judgment, the Third Cir-
cuit stated that the analysis must focus on the nature of the inju-
ries that the judgment was intended to remedy.74 When discussing
the nature of the injuries, the court stated that an important factor
in the determination is whether the remedy would compensate for
injuries already suffered, or protect against potential future
harm.7 5 It is suggested, however, that the Third Circuit was actu-
ally focusing on the purpose of the relief rather than the nature of
the injury. 6 The "nature of the injury" refers to the type of harm
actually suffered by a party,77 whether it consists of injury to the
72 See id. The Third Circuit conceded that an examination of only the form of the
judgment could possibly lead to circumvention of the legislative intent behind the stay. See
id. at 275-76; cf. In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454, 455-56 (6th Cir. 1982) (enforcement action
against debtor not different in substance from attempt to enforce money judgment), vacated
and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 810 (1983). But see Illinois v. Electrical Utils., 41 Bankr. 874, 877
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (substance of governmental action not merely an attempt to obtain money
judgment).
11 See 733 F.2d at 275-78.
7' See id. at 278. The bankruptcy court, ruling in favor of the debtor, had concluded
that a money judgment was any judgment requiring the expenditure of money. See In re
Penn Terra Ltd., 24 Bankr. 427, 433 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, Penn Terra Ltd. v.
Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). On appeal, the Third Circuit
rejected this interpretation as unduly expansive. 733 F.2d at 277. The Third Circuit con-
cluded that almost all injunctions require that money be spent, and an injunction that does
not require some expenditure "may often be an effective nullity." Id. at 277-78.
75 See 733 F.2d at 276-77. The Third Circuit determined that any action seeking to
"prevent culpable conduct in futuro" normally would not be construed as an action for a
money judgment. Id. at 277. The court concluded that "the very nature of injunctive relief is
that it addresses injuries which may not be compensated by money." Id.
76 Cf. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[d]amages are awarded
as a form of substantial redress ... [and] are intended to compensate a party for an injury
suffered or other loss"). The Penn Terra court may have mislabelled the distinction be-
tween compensation for past damages and the prevention of future harm as relating to the
nature of the injury, rather than relating to the purpose of the relief. Compare Penn Terra,
733 F.2d at 278 (compensation/prevention distinction relates to nature of injury) with Price,
688 F.2d at 212 (compensation/prevention distinction concerns purpose of relief).
11 See, e.g., Raphael J. Musicus, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 743 F.2d 503, 508 (7th Cir.
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person,78 the deprivation of a right,79 or a definite monetary loss.80
Determining the nature of the injury, however, is not always con-
clusive in ascertaining whether the relief is properly categorized as
a money judgment."'
Considering the second element of this proposed analysis, re-
lief generally can be granted for either a compensatory or a pre-
ventive purpose.82 Compensatory relief is granted to make a party
whole by compensating for any loss that may have been sus-
tained."' Preventive relief, however, is aimed at precluding future
1984) (plaintiff injured by defendant's alleged breach of contract); Chicago, St. P., M. & 0.
Ry. v. Pender Drainage Dist., 183 F.2d 773, 773 (8th Cir. 1950) (per curiam) (plaintiff
harmed by alleged taking and damaging of right of way); Moore v. Carney, 84 Mich. App.
399, 406, 269 N.W.2d 614, 617 (1978) (oppressive acts of defendant resulted in plaintiff los-
ing corporate office); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (5th ed. 1979) (injury is "[a]ny
wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, . . . or property").
78 See, e.g., Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp. 136, 138 (E.D. La. 1974).
In Anderson, a child was almost burned to death in a fire that ravaged her home. See id.
Severe scarring led to great limitations on mobility and use of the child's extremities. Id.;
see also Herman v. Welland Chem., Ltd., 580 F. Supp. 823, 825 (M.D. Pa. 1984) (plaintiff
sustained severe physical injury after being struck by automobile); Tindall v. Moore, 417 F.
Supp. 548, 550-51 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (plaintiff's index finger mutilated by malfunctioning
machine).
79 See, e.g., Davis v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. 502, 506 (D. Md. 1980). In Fowler, authorities
seized some of the plaintiff's property during a valid search and refused to return it to him.
See id. at 504. The court ruled that under the fourteenth amendment the plaintiff had been
deprived of property without due process of law. See id. at 505-06.
80 See, e.g., Caesars World, Inc. v. Venus Lounge, Inc., 520 F.2d 269, 271 (3d Cir. 1975)
(plaintiff suffered economic loss due to infringement of service mark); Laxton v. Orkin Ex-
terminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 431-32 (Tenn. 1982) (monetary loss includes property
damages and out-of-pocket expenses).
81 Compare, e.g., Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d 431, 431-32 (money
damages for contamination of water supply) with Davis v. Fowler, 504 F. Supp. 502, 506 (D.
Md. 1980) (injunctive relief for deprivation of rights).
82 See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Carter v. Orle-
ans Parish Pub. Schools, 725 F.2d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 1984) (correction of falsified records is
equitable remedy intended to prevent future harm); Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern
R.R. Presidents Conference, 166 F. Supp. 163, 168 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (injunctive relief under
antitrust laws designed to prevent repetition of unlawful practices), aft'd, 273 F.2d 218
(1959), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); Robison, The Confidence Game: An
Approach to the Law About Trade Secrets, 25 Aruz. L. REV. 347, 357 (1983) (plaintiff in
trade secret litigation has choice of preventive or compensatory relief).
83 See H. OLECK, DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 12, at 22 (1961). Referring to
"actual" damages as "compensatory" damages, Oleck defines them as the expenses that are
"the natural and reasonable result of an injury or loss." See id. Actual damages are those
that "suffice to restore the injured party." Id. at 23; see also Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Jarboe Livestock Comm'n, 159 F.2d 527, 530 (10th Cir. 1947) (theory behind money dam-
ages is compensation of losses); D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.1, at 135 (1973) (money judgment
intended to make up for loss suffered by plaintiff). Theoretically, compensatory relief should
be commensurate with the harm; the intent of such relief is to place the injured party in the
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injury or harm, and in cases in which such relief is appropriate,
mere money judgments cannot furnish adequate relief.8 4
The method chosen to effect relief will be derived from an
analysis of the nature of the injury and the purpose for granting
relief.8 When a party has suffered some definite loss, and the pur-
pose of the relief is to compensate that party, payment of a defi-
nite sum of money will often suffice." However, when there is a
threat of indefinite harm not readily convertible into a monetary
amount, and the purpose of relief is to prevent such harm, injunc-
tive relief is often the best remedy.8 7 Injunctive relief often calls
same position in which he would have been had the injury not occurred. H. OLECK, supra, §
80, at 59.
" See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 276-78. The Third Circuit referred to preventive relief
as relief that would "protect against potential future harm." Id. at 277 (emphasis in origi-
nal); see also Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 573 F. Supp. 1423,
1428 (D.R.I. 1983) ("sole function of . . . injunction . . . to forestall future violation")
(quoting United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952)), afJ'd in
part, rev'd in part, 739 F.2d 671 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 964 (1985). Preven-
tive relief, involving preliminary and permanent injunctions, requires the consideration of
whether the present circumstances, if left unchanged, will result in serious irreparable harm.
See A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 518 (3d Cir. 1976); Goldhaber v. Foley, 519 F.
Supp. 466, 473 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Section 2 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, see 42 U.S.C. §
6973(a) (1982), allowing for abatement of environmental hazards caused by the dumping of
toxic substances into the environment, has been construed as providing injunctive as op-
posed to compensatory relief, see United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 17 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1329, 1334 (N.D. Ohio 1981); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp.
870, 887-88 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
88 See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
88 See Brown, The Law/Equity Dichotomy in Maryland, 39 MD. L. REv. 427, 433
(1980). When damages will remedy the plaintiff's injury adequately, the relief will be limited
to damages, and injunctive relief will not be available. See id. at 432-33; see also D. DOBBS,
supra note 83, § 2.5, at 57 (equitable relief denied unless plaintiff's remedy at law inade-
quate). If the object injured can be valued and replaced, the plaintiff's remedy is for a
money judgment. Brown, supra, at 433 n.45; see, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 982
(8th Cir.) (compensatory relief measurable based on past educational deprivation, but would
not ensure future compliance), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982); Schiff v. Williams, 519
F.2d 257, 262 (5th Cir.) (award of backpay for past earnings a money judgment), cert. de-
nied sub nom. 423 U.S. 834 (1975); Caesars World, Inc. v. Venus Lounge, Inc., 520 F.2d 269,
274 (3d Cir. 1975) (monetary relief will be granted only with evidence of actual damage).
8V See Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33
U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 346 (1981). Injunctive relief will be granted when the plaintiff can estab-
lish the inadequacy of a monetary remedy. Id. Damages have been deemed inadequate when
it would be practically impossible to determine them adequately. Brown, supra note 86, at
433. When exercise of or forbearance from particular conduct is the goal of the relief, courts
generally will order an injunction. See Rendleman, supra, at 346. In some cases, however,
courts will exercise equity jurisdiction when a remedy at law exists, but is insufficient or
uncertain. See Brown, supra note 86, at 428 & nn.8-9.
In United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La.
1965), the defendants sought to prevent black citizens of Louisiana from exercising their
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for some affirmative action by the party against whom the relief is
sought.8 8 Although some injunctive relief requires the expenditure
of money for execution, this is not enough to classify the relief as a
"money judgment."89
civil rights, id. at 334. The defendants relied on intimidation, systematic economic coercion,
and physical violence. Id. In bringing actions, the federal government attempted not to com-
pensate the black victims for the injuries suffered as a result of the racial discrimination,
but to prevent further discrimination and coercion. See id. at 334-36. Consequently, the
court enjoined the defendants from further interference with the rights of the black citizens,
id. at 335, and expressly recognized both the inadequacy of monetary damages and the ne-
cessity of injunctive relief, id. at 349-50. Finally, the court concluded that effective protec-
tion against further acts of violence and intimidation committed by the defendants could be
accomplished only by broad injunctive relief. Id. at 356; see also Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Comm'n v. Crown Colony Commodity Options Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911, 911 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (injunction intended to prevent future wrongs); Stuthman v. Lippert, 205 Neb. 302,
304, 287 N.W.2d 80, 82 (1980) (purpose of injunction "preventive, protective and prohibi-
tory"). In Stuthman, the court denied injunctive relief because the alleged wrongful activi-
ties had ceased and were not likely to resume. Id. at 305, 287 N.W.2d at 82. The plaintiff
was not precluded from seeking injunctive relief, however, should any future violations oc-
cur. Id.
When toxic wastes are dumped into the environment, the prospective harm to people
and the environment will not be abated absent a clean up of the wastes, even if actual
dumping has ceased. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331,
338 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983) (risk of contamination exists from undisclosed barrels or waste resi-
dues); see also Brief of Petitioner at 43, In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), afl'd,
105 S. Ct. 705 (1985) (abatement of hazard necessary to prevent serious harm in the future);
Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 27, at 861-63 (toxic wastes left in environment create risk of
further harm).
88 See D. DOBBS, supra note 83, § 2.10, at 105. Injunctions order the defendant either to
act or not to act in a designated manner. See, e.g., Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 269 & n.2, 278
(order required backfilling and erosion control to preserve environment and rectify safety
hazard); see D. DomaS, supra note 83, §§ 1.1 at 2, 2.10 at 105.
89 See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667-68 (1974) (when states prohibited
from denying welfare benefits to otherwise qualified alien recipients, "fiscal consequences to
state treasuries . . .were the necessary result of compliance with decrees which by their
terms were prospective in nature"); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982)
(payment or expenditure of money does not foreclose possibility of equitable relief); ICC v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 501 F.2d 908, 914 (8th Cir. 1974) (in railroad situations,
where operation is physically impossible without substantial expenditures, issuance of in-
junction is an equitable determination), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975); see also Tustin v.
Heckler, 591 F. Supp. 1049, 1056 (D.N.J.) (equitable relief not prohibited because expendi-
ture of money required), vacated in part, 749 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1984). The Price court
relied on a balancing test to determine whether the injunctive relief was warranted. 688 F.2d
at 211, 213. The court considered four factors: (1) whether there is a likelihood that the
plaintiff will succeed on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if
injunctive relief is not granted; (3) whether the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs
the harm that will result to the other party if relief is granted; and (4) whether granting
relief is in the public interest. Id. at 211; Esquibel v. Torvik, 571 F. Supp. 732, 733 (D. Wyo.
1983); Robb Container Corp. v. Sho-Me Co., 566 F. Supp. 1143, 1151-52 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
However, if the plaintiff is a sovereign and the activity sought to be enjoined endangers the
public health, "injunctive relief is proper, without resort to balancing." Illinois v. Milwau-
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Applying the three-part analysis outlined above, it is submit-
ted that the relief sought in actions to enforce a pre-petition order
requiring clean up of a toxic waste site is not a money judgment.
Traditionally, judgments classified as "money judgments" have
been awarded to compensate an injured party for some harm suf-
fered.90 Nevertheless, certain types of relief, although involving an
expenditure of money by the defendant, have been held not to be
money judgments.9 1 For instance, although an order requiring the
defendant to fund an examination of a toxic waste site required
the defendant to spend money, the order was deemed a form of
equitable relief.92 In the absence of definite injury, the purpose of
kee, 599 F.2d 151, 166 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); see
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337-38 (4th Cir. 1983). Also,
when public health legislation is involved, the focus shifts "from irreparable injury to con-
cern for the general public interest." 714 F.2d at 338.
9o See Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961
(1979). In Jaffee, the plaintiff requested that the government provide or subsidize medical
care for members of the United States Army injured while on active duty. Id. at 714. The
court determined that the claim was, in effect, one for money damages. Id. at 715.
Similarly, when a defendant negligently and wrongfully terminated a plaintiff's water
supply, the damages sought by the plaintiff were deemed a money judgment. See Jordan v.
Metropolitan Utils. Dist., 498 F.2d 514, 516 (8th Cir. 1974). The nature of the injuries in
these cases was some form of actual and definite harm to the plaintiff. See Jaffee, 592 F.2d
at 714; Jordan, 498 F.2d at 515. The purpose of the relief was to compensate for such harm.
In Raphael J. Musicus, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 743 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1984), the plain-
tiff sued, alleging breach of lease agreements, failure to provide liability and fire insurance,
failure to maintain the premises in good repair, and failure to pay rent. Id. at 505. The relief
sought included compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 505, 508. The court labeled this
relief an attempt to obtain a money judgment against the defendant. Id. at 508. The aim of
this relief was not to prevent the defendant from injuring the plaintiff in the future, but to
compensate the plaintiff for harm already suffered. See id. at 509. In Chicago, St. P., M. &
0. Ry. v. Pender Drainage Dist., 183 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1950), the defendant allegedly took
and damaged the plaintiff's right of way. Id. at 773. If the plaintiff had prevailed on the
merits, the relief obtained would not have been preventive, but rather, would have been a
money judgment to compensate the plaintiff. Id.
When payment of compensatory damages is the most appropriate method of effecting
relief, see, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir.) (payment of money would
satisfy plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979), it
becomes apparent that the judgment can be classified as a "money judgment."
9 See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
92 See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213 (3d Cir. 1982). In Price, evidence at trial
revealed that the groundwater around the defendant's site was contaminated with toxic sub-
stances. Id. at 209. Because the region around the site had no alternative water source, the
district court concluded that an "imminent and substantial danger" existed. Id. The district
court, however, viewed the plaintiff's requests for funds as a claim for damages requiring the
payment of money. Id. at 211. The Third Circuit, however, determined that the district
court misread Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979), and concluded that the
relief sought by the government was a claim not for a monetary award, but for a preventive
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the relief in such situations is the prevention of future harm, and
the crucial element of these judgments is not the payment of
money, but the restoration of the equities.9 3 The Supreme Court in
Ohio v. Kovacs recently has lent support to the contention that
orders enforcing state regulatory statutes by requiring affirmative
action must be distinguished from judgments awarding mere pecu-
niary relief from a receiver in bankruptcy.9 4 Moreover, it is submit-
ted that the readiness of some courts to hold that the enforcement
of a backpay award in a labor dispute is exempt from the auto-
matic stay95 indicates a proper willingness to look at factors other
than the pecuniary nature of relief in defining what is and what is
not a money judgment under the Code.
In Penn Terra, the harm suffered was not definite and was not
easily convertible into monetary terms; the injury involved a threat
of future harm to the environment and to individuals that was
likely to occur if the toxic wastes were not cleaned up. 6 Although
compliance with the order by removal of the wastes already depos-
ited was somewhat compensatory in nature,' the true purpose of
remedy, 688 F.2d at 211-13. The court stated that "damages are awarded as a form of sub-
stantial redress. intended to compensate a party for an injury suffered or other loss." Id.
at 212. The plaintiff's request, the court concluded, was not for "a traditional form of dam-
ages." Id.
" See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 276-77. Since the payment of money would not prevent
any future harm resulting from the presence of toxic wastes in the environment, the Penn
Terra court deemed equitable relief the proper remedy. Cf. D. DOBBS, supra note 83, § 2.5,
at 57 (equitable relief granted when remedy at law inadequate).
9 See Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 711 n.11 (1985).
" See Ahrens Aircraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1983), enforcing Ahrens
Aircraft, Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 839 (1981); NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 293
(5th Cir. 1981). In Evans, the court held that the NLRB is a governmental unit, and an
action by the Board to enter an award of backpay was a valid exercise of its police or regula-
tory powers. 639 F.2d at 293. The court, however, expressed "no opinion as to whether an
action to execute or enforce [this judgment] would be exempt from the automatic stay." Id.
The Ahrens court attempted to resolve the issue that was not addressed in Evans. 703
F.2d at 23. The First Circuit held that the enforcement of a backpay award against the
debtor corporation is not subject to the automatic stay. Id. at 24. Specifically, the court
determined that "[i]t is ... clear that 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) and (5) prevents the applica-
tion of the automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) and (2)." Id. It is submitted
that since the court considered § 362(b)(5) and concluded that it does not stay the attempt
to enforce the judgment, a fortiori such a judgment cannot be a money judgment.
91 See 733 F.2d at 278; see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714
F.2d 331, 338 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983) (risk of environmental damage exists from waste-filled
barrels on property and from residue of waste formerly on property); United States v. Price,
688 F.2d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 1982) (wells contaminated or about to be contaminated); Ginsberg
& Weiss, supra note 27, at 861-63 (hazardous wastes not cleaned up result in physical, prop-
erty, and environmental damages).
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the relief was prospective; only if the wastes were cleaned up could
the potential future harm be prevented."
The presence of toxic chemicals may indeed cause immediate
harm to the land upon which they are deposited. However, the fo-
cus of clean-up orders is speedy removal to prevent both the full
integration of these substances into the environment and the in-
jury resulting from such integration. 8 Therefore, as in Penn Terra,
a governmental unit that institutes a proceeding to enforce a pre-
petition clean-up order generally will be seeking not compensation
as such, but affirmative action.9 The best method of accomplishing
this relief is through the use of injunctions requiring affirmative
action by the polluting corporation.100 The payment of money
damages does not halt the permeation of toxic substances into the
environment. 10'
CONCLUSION
A pre-petition clean-up order against a corporation that has
dumped hazardous substances into the environment should not be
subject to the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
Public policy mandates that bankruptcy interests yield to the in-
terests safeguarded by environmental protection policy. Although
.7 See, e.g., Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 278 (order intended to restore environment and
rectify safety hazard); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982) (if status quo
allowed to continue, result will be serious irreparable injury).
98 See United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1982). Courts have recog-
nized that one of the purposes of environmental protection statutes is to remedy past occur-
rences that continue to pose a threat to the public health and the environment. See United
States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329, 1333-34 (N.D. Ohio
1981). Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §
6973 (Supp. V 1982), is intended to rectify conditions that constitute imminent hazards to
the public health or environment, and "[i]ts focus is on the prevention and ameliorization
of conditions, rather than the cessation of any particular . . . conduct." United States v.
Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1139-40 (D. Conn. 1980) (emphasis added).
The danger posed by the migration of toxic wastes from a disposal site into the sur-
rounding environment led New York to declare a health emergency at the Love Canal site in
1978. Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 27, at 860. Recognizing the danger presented by al-
lowing toxic substances to permeate the surrounding soil, New York spent more than 20
million dollars in an attempt to contain the wastes. Id. Studies of the Love Canal area
indicate that exposure to the hazardous substances resulted in serious health problems to
those who lived near the site. Id. at 873-74 & nn.55-57.
99 See 733 F.2d at 278.
100 See id. at 269 & n.2, 278; cf. United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp 870,
888-89 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (injunctive relief requiring defendant to take affirmative action to
abate environmental hazard).
"I See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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money judgments are not exempt from the automatic stay, a clean-
up order should not be classified as a money judgment. Money
judgments are awarded to compensate parties for harm suffered; a
judgment ordering a corporation to clean up toxic wastes, however,
is intended to prevent future harm to the public and the environ-
ment. This purpose can be accomplished only as the result of af-
firmative action by the party against whom the relief is sought.
Payment of money alone will not protect future generations from
the devastating effects of improper toxic waste disposal.
Richard J. DeMarco, Jr.
